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Abstract: South Africa is a leading example of democracy in Africa albeit many argue that it has lost 
meaningful direction in aspects which range from its practice of majority rule, social cohesion, and neo-
liberalization of its political economy and international diplomacy. South Africa could fairly well be 
viewed as an emerging middle power but many of its actions have belied this thus allowing certain 
analysts to consider it as inconsistent, confusing, and even sinister. Some of the core problematic areas 
of South African democracy include poverty, unemployment, inequality, high level of HIV/AIDS, 
corruption, fast decaying educational system, electricity (load) shedding, fast loss of rand value in the 
international market and rampant strike actions, especially in the mining industry. However, this paper 
depends on the documentary method of research to examine the drama surrounding the security upgrade 
of the President’s home at Nkandla. The findings show that in a democratic society like South Africa, 
majority rule may sometimes be a limitation of democratic practices. In order to avert the challenges 
which majority rule may pose to the other principles of democracy, the principles of values, such as 
separation of power among the three levels of government and rule of law, must be respected. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite differing views that South Africa has lost direction with respect to the 
practice of majority rule, social cohesion, international diplomacy and neo-
liberalization of its political-economy, it is still considered by many as a leading 
example of democracy in Africa. While South Africa is associated with prestigious 
emerging market accolades, some of its actions have been continentally and globally 
viewed by some analysts as inconsistent, confusing, and even sinister (Fourie, 2013). 
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Many of these analysts have argued that South Africa transformed its horrific history 
of discrimination, racism and ‘legal’ apartheid rule to a beacon of human rights at 
global level albeit not without limitations1. For example, its immigration policy 
configuration for African immigrants has been a subject of critical scrutiny 
especially in the wake of large scale outbreak of xenophobic attacks in 2008 and 
2014 respectively2. In a more general context, South African democratic governance 
has passed through several trials: poverty, rising unemployment, inequality, 
HIV/AIDS, corruption, decaying educational system, electricity shedding, fast loss 
of rand value in the international market and rampant strike especially in the mining 
industry3. However, our contention in this study is the complex situation that 
developed in the political system of the country following the investigation and 
report on the security upgrade of President Jacob Zuma’s Nkandla residence by the 
generally perceived competent Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela. The investigation 
and report have exposed several weaknesses in South African democracy ranging 
from the dangers of one dominant political party exemplified in African National 
Congress (ANC) to the loophole and strength of majority rule as both a major 
shortfall and advantage of democracy in any context.  
Beside the concerns raised in the private and public sector about the implications of 
the crises of the ‘security upgrade at Nkandla’ - homestead of President Zuma - there 
has not been comprehensive literature that attempts to analyze the impact of the 
crises on South Africa’s nascent democracy. This paper seeks to fill the identified 
gap in literature, drawing on available document on South African democracy 
covering the period 1994 to 2016. The research questions to be answered in this 
study include: How do democracy and majority rule affect justice? What are the 
challenges in deploying majority rule in a democracy? What are the implications of 
the first and second research questions on South African democracy? In order to 
answer these research questions, we explore the crises that arose from the security 
upgrade of President Zuma’s Nkandla homestead to expose how the rule of law and 
in fact, government institutions malign the interests of those whom the majority have 
put in power. This paper therefore uses the documentary analysis method of research 
to argue that the handling of the crises of the Nkandla security upgrade in South 
Africa is a major negation of the hopes of people who expect government to uphold 
the constitution and or the rule of law. The paper consists of nine sections: the 
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introduction, and objective of the study and to inform the reader about the focus of 
the study and the methodology used to conduct the research. Next is literature 
review which centers on understanding democracy and majority rule - a 
conceptualization of democracy and majority rule in the South African context; an 
expose on the Nkandla security upgrade, which presents a focused discussion and 
analysis of the investigation of President Zuma’s home security upgrade. The other 
sections include cabinet and the public protector’s investigation and report, 
which looks at the President and his cabinet’s attempt to undermine the report; 
parliament and the public protector’s investigation and report details 
Parliament’s attempt to undermine the report and the Public Protector’s 
independence of office; the constitutional court judgment provides a thorough 
interpretation of the implication of the apex court’s (Constitutional Court) ruling on 
the Nkandla security upgrade and its effect on the South African democracy and 
finally we draw conclusions based on the analysis of the entire discussion. 
Objective of the Study 
The objective of the study is to use documentary analysis method of research to 
examine the implications of application of majority rule to democracy and good 
governance in South Africa exploring the crises of the ‘security upgrade at Nkandla’ 
- homestead of President Zuma as a case study. 
 
2. Methodology 
As stated earlier, this paper relied on documentary analysis method of research. This 
method allows researchers to select documents that are relevant to the study for the 
purpose of analysis (Payne & Payne, 2004; Mogalakwe, 2006). This method of 
research enables researchers to determine the documents that are relevant to the 
study based on their significance to the subject under investigation. Dey (2005, 
p.105) suggests that in documentary analysis method of research, the basis for 
choosing documents is dependent on necessary extracts which have to be relevant to 
the subjects being investigated by the researcher. 
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3. Literature Review 
3.1. Understanding Democracy and Majority Rule 
Democracy means different things to different people, but the common thread is still 
human involvement in the decision-making and governance processes. Therefore, it 
is commonplace to use democracy to design different forms of government, 
especially where the citizens of the country are involved in the decision-making 
process - be it in ancient or modern times. For Fox and Meyer (1995, p. 35), 
democracy is a political system whereby the decision-making power and process are 
shared among the citizens of a country. Malan (2014, p. 55) asserts that the complex 
nature of modern society makes it impossible for citizens to make direct decisions 
owing to the use of elected representatives who make decisions on their behalf. 
Therefore, democracy could be direct or indirect, depending on the level of people’s 
involvement. The common view of analysts is that direct democracy is where there 
is absolute direct involvement of the citizenry in the decision-making process, while 
indirect democracy gives people the opportunity to periodically elect into power 
those who represent them in the decision-making process. In a direct democratic 
setting, it is common for the citizens to sit together and enact new laws or change 
the already existing laws, if necessary. In a representative democracy - such as South 
African since 1994 - the citizens usually elect their leaders periodically to take 
decisions concerning the laws.1 
However, any democracy is dependent upon certain basic principles including 
majority rule. Khalo (2008, p. 67) is of the view that democracy is a form of 
government where the state is governed by the majority of its population: this 
suggests that in a democracy, as the saying goes, ‘majority carries the vote’. This is 
common among democracies in the world because decisions are made based on 
numbers. However, some measures are usually established to protect minority view. 
For example, in any democracy the hope of the minority is usually to follow the 
legitimate means provided by the constitution to contest issues. More often than not, 
the constitution provides for separation of powers thus the executive arm, the 
parliament and the judiciary form the three arms of government but each operates as 
distinctive government institutions while interrelating in operations. The hope of the 
minority view is usually anchored in the judiciary: in any modern democracy, the 
judiciary is charged with the responsibility of interpretation of law or law 
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adjudication. In order to come out clearer in understanding the basic tenets of 
democracy, we share the views of Theletsane, (2014) that, contrary to the views 
expressed by some academics, democracy cannot have more than one meaning. 
Theletsane, (2014) further argues, in line with Fringpong (1999), that even if there 
are different interpretations of democracy, there are certain underlying factors that 
must be consistent within any such interpretation. Among such underlying factors, 
and drawing from the works of Fringpong (1999), Gildenhuys and Knip, (2012, pp. 
111-112), Theletsane, (2014), Madue, Tsolo & Ramoabi (2014), are the following: 
 The rule of law and constitutionalism must be practiced; 
 The will of the people/majority are respected; 
 Citizen’s participation is essential and encouraged; 
 Citizen’s participation is exercised periodically in free and fair elections through 
which elected representatives assume leadership positions; 
 The government is established in power only for the purpose of serving the 
citizens;  
 The government is subject to the will of the people who are empowered by the 
constitution to effect a change in government; 
 Separation of the powers, based on checks and balances, should be contained in 
the constitution and respected; 
 Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in the 
constitution. 
The fact is that democracy as a concept is a slippery slope as well as an idea that may 
not be attainable as an end-goal in a society. However, its practice requires that the 
central principles highlighted as tenets of democracy apply to the lives of the 
majority in the country (see Theletsane, 2014). In a democratic setting, majority is a 
crucial factor in decision-making and could be seen as one of the attributes of 
democracy that guarantees stability in a country. It is so largely because application 
of the majority rule principle may easily suppress the opinion of the minority, who 
may rightfully, view such suppression as a compromise or defeat. In the next section, 
we turn to the long investigation of the security upgrade of President Zuma’s 
homestead at Nkandla. 
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3.2 The Investigation of the Security Upgrade of President Zuma’s Homestead 
at Nkandla 
President Jacob Zuma’s Nkandla homestead has been surrounded by controversy, 
owing to the alleged dubious escalations of the cost of the security upgrade. 
However, the drama of Nkandlagate actually started to unfold after it was reported 
that the upgrade included several outlandish and non-security additions to the private 
property. Some of these unrelated additions include a helipad, amphitheater, 
underground bunkers, a swimming pool, a chicken run, visitors' center and a military 
hospital (Madonsela, 2014). The saga shows that the Department of Public Works 
ignored the provision in the ministerial hand book that it may expend not more than 
R100, 000 on security improvements at the private houses of public officials1. 
According to the ministerial hand book any improvements exceeding that amount 
shall be at the expense of such public official but in this case over R246 million was 
allocated for the homestead renovation (South African history online, 2014). 
According to the Minister of Public Works (2013), upgrades to the Nkandla 
homestead only began on the 29th of August, 2009. Apparently on 13 December 
2011 and 12 December 2012 respectively, formal complaints were lodged at the 
office of Public Protector both from private citizens and opposition parties, in 
particular the Democratic Alliance (DA). More importantly, the investigation was 
conducted partly in terms of the provisions of Section 182 of the constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (see 1996, South African Constitution). Public Protector, 
Thuli Madonsela's final report on security upgrades to the compound was titled 
‘Secure in comfort’ and it was officially published on 19 March 2014 (Wilson, 
2014). 
3.3 Cabinet and the Public Protector’s Investigation and Report 
The first attempt by the ANC to undermine the probe at the executive level appeared 
to be the calculated move by the Department of Public Works to deny the existence 
of any such project at Nkandla. The department later admitted that the security 
upgrade was indeed ongoing but that it was duly declared a National Key Point in 
line with Act 102 of 1980 (National Key Points Act 102 of 1980).2 Another 
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indication that the ruling party and its leadership wanted to undermine the 
investigation of the Public Protector appeared on 13 January 2013, when the Public 
Protector informed the President of her being unable to conclude the investigation in 
30 days as stipulated in Section 3(2) of the Executive Members' Ethics Act 
(Executive Members' Ethics Act 82 of 1998). 
This provision of the section stipulates that the Public Protector’s report is due at the 
end of the 30 days; if not completed within 30 days, the Public Protector must submit 
a report when the investigation is completed. The President and his legal team 
pounced on the opportunity to question the validity of any report prepared by the 
Public Protector not concluded within the 30 days (Executive Members' Ethics Act 
82 of 1998). The President, along with his legal team, indicated to the Public 
Protector that she should provide evidence whether the President has power to 
condone any Public Protector’s non-compliance of section 3(2) of the Executive 
Members' Ethics Act (Executive Members' Ethics Act 82 of 1998). This appeared to 
be an attempt to undermine chapter 9 of the South African constitution that provides 
for the democratic institutions in South Africa which the Public Protector represents 
(see 1996 South African Constitution). 
The government’s security cluster ministers (ministers of defence, police, home 
affairs and international relations) raised security questions based on the conclusion 
of the investigation. The Public Protector was eventually taken to court on 8 
November 2013, on the grounds that the security cluster ministers were not given 
enough time and opportunity to study the initial report before the final report was 
released; the cluster ministers later withdrew the case (SABC Online News, 2013). 
In the view of many, this was interpreted as an attempt to frustrate the Public 
Protector because it may be questionable why it is necessary for the cluster ministers 
to study the preliminary report before its final publication. This could possibly raise 
questions over impartiality or credibility of the report while at the same time 
compromising the independence of the office of the Public Protector.In another 
move to justify the renovations, the Public Works Minister Thulas Nxesi, on 19 
December 2013, presented an inter-ministerial task team report as evidence that 
South African public expenditure cleared the President of any wrong doing for the 
security upgrade in his homestead. The question arises: should such clearance 
supersede the investigation of the Public Protector’s remedial action and findings? 
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This would have cleared the way for the executive to have its way on any issue in 
the political system of South Africa and unlimited power for the President 
responsible for the appointment of the cabinet members. 
The need for the provision of democratic institutions in Chapter 9 of the South 
African Constitution cannot be over-emphasized, especially because of the need to 
keep the President in check from exerting absolute and arbitrary power in 
government. On the 11th of August 2014, the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) was 
mandated by President Zuma to investigate the security improvement of his home 
and the Public Protector’s report (SABC Online News, 2014). At a certain point, it 
emerged that SIU was suing the architect (Mr. M. Makhanya) in charge of the 
security improvement of Nkandla for R155.3 million in the KwaZulu-Natal High 
Court (SABC Online News, 2014); it was a successful diversion from all the 
institutions, persons and public involved in the matter. Suing an independent 
businessman who has no access to public fund expenditure would have little effect 
on the causal matter. Even if the over-spending was as a result of his quotation, it 
also provided evidence that South African procurement procedures were not 
followed in the security upgrade. SIU’s report on the matter was brought before 
Parliament on 12 September, 2014 (Nhleko, 2015) which noted that Zuma’s family 
did not unduly benefit from the upgrades, thus contradicting the report of the Public 
Protector which asserted that the President and his family unduly benefited from the 
security upgrade (Mahomed, 2015). 
The unit shifted the blame of overspending to the architect who worked on the project 
and the public works officials. The report also reiterated that the security upgrade in 
the President’s homestead was still inadequate despite the overspending, a further 
indication of the recklessness of the Department of Public Works in the handling of 
the project. In President Zuma’s letter to the Public Protector, dated 11 September 
2014, he proclaimed his disagreement with the Public Protector’s assertion that, by 
law, her report is not subject to any review or second-guessing by any minister or 
cabinet member (Zuma, 2014); his view was that the findings or remedial actions by 
the Public Protector are not final by law. The Public Protector made it clear earlier 
that it was only the court that could review remedial actions she recommends; this 
was later upheld by the Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
The Minister of Police, Nkosinathi Nhleko, on 28 May 2015, released a report on 
the security upgrade of the homestead, reiterating that the swimming pool, the cattle 
kraal, the chicken run, visitor's centre and amphitheatre were necessary security 
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requirements for the President. The Minister of Police drew the conclusion that 
President Zuma was not obliged to refund South Africans any money because of 
those features, formally concluding thus: 
As the Minister assigned to make a determination on the security upgrades of the 
president’s homestead at Nkandla and having paid due consideration to the facts 
given, provided evidence that points to the questionable features, namely the animal 
enclosure (cattle kraal and/or goat kraal with culvert and chicken run), fire pool 
(swimming pool), soil retention wall, amphitheater and visitors’ centre as security 
features that are in accordance with the physical security requirements and/or 
interest (Nhleko, 2015). 
We argue that from the inception of the security upgrade in President Zuma’s 
homestead, through the investigation of the matter by the Public Protector and all the 
debate over her report, the leadership of the ANC knew that many anomalies existed 
and chose to capitalize on its majority in Parliament. Thus, the party’s leadership 
tossed around with executive powers and its majority rule in Parliament to protect 
the President. For example, with the majority of ANC in Parliament it was certain 
that the opposition may not be able to impeach the President and the Speaker of 
Parliament. ANC members adamantly rebuffed the attacks on the President, 
including the signal jamming of all devices during the debates in Parliament. Our 
view is that, with ANC holding a little above 62% of the seats in the current SA 
National Assembly, it is certain that the opposition working together may never be 
able to secure the 2/3 majority required for the impeachment of the President or 
Speaker of the Parliament. The ANC trusts its internal cohesion that its members 
will stay together in defense of President Zuma while confident in the certainty that 
the opposition in national assembly cannot garner up to the 50% vote of 
parliamentary members required to pass a vote of no confidence on the President. 
The next section examines the role of Parliament in the protection of the now 
infamously scandalous security upgrade at Nkandla. 
3.4 Parliament and the Public Protectors Investigation and Report 
On 28 April 2014, a parliamentary ad hoc committee set up to consider Zuma's 
response to the Public Protector’s report was referred to the incoming Parliament 
that was to be in place after the 2014 South African general elections; 7 May, 2014 
was set for the general elections (Parliament, 2014). A second parliamentary ad hoc 
committee was established in August, 2014 to consider the report of the following: 
the inter-ministerial task team released in December 2013, the Public Protector’s' 
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final report released in March 2014 and the SIU's report published in September 
2014 along with Zuma's responses to each of them (Azzakani, 2014). The second ad 
hoc committee challenged the findings of the Public Protector and referred the matter 
to security experts, including the Minister of Police, in November 2014. 
Our view is that the ANC uses its majority in parliament to protect the chief 
executive and the cabinet members. For example, why would it be necessary for the 
ad hoc committee to consider other views and reports that had been used by the 
executive to attempt to circumvent/manipulate the findings and remedial actions 
outlined by the Public Protector? It is also clear in chapter 9 section 182 (1) that the 
Public Protector has the power to make or enforce remedial action (1996 South 
African Constitution).  In the Public Protector’s letter to the president she stressed 
that by law it is only the judiciary that has the power to set aside her findings and 
remedial action. Again, in our view, it would have been more logical for the ANC to 
approach the Constitutional Court to interpret the findings and remedial course 
recommended by the Public Protector and subsequently determine whether the 
findings and remedial course of the Public Protector were final. Rather than to go 
through the judiciary, the ANC chose to invoke ‘majority rule’ in parliament. 
On 18 August 2015, the National Assembly adopted the report of a third 
parliamentary ad hoc committee which accepted the findings of Nxesi and Nhleko 
and cleared Zuma of any wrong doing (ENCA Online News, 2015). This move was 
meant to conclude the case, irrespective of the views of the opposition parties in 
parliament. To set aside the findings of the Public Protector on such a scandalous 
case involving the homestead of the chief executive was viewed as an attempt to set 
a poor precedent in the South African democracy. The second-guessing of ANC 
majority was evident in the controlling executive arm of government and parliament. 
It was separation of powers that prevailed over majority, though the success was 
limited since the Constitutional Court claimed that it has no powers to remove Zuma 
or order an impeachment, largely because of the principles of separation of powers 
among the three branches of government. 
The two main opposition parties in parliament, the Democratic Alliance and the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) held the view that both the president and the 
Speaker of Parliament must respect and act in favour of the Public Protector’s report. 
In fact, from the second quarter of 2014, EFF’s approach was even more raucous as 
it demanded that the President pay the money spent on his Nkandla residence (South 
African History Online, 2015). In August of 2014, the EFF adopted a popular slogan, 
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‘pay back the money’ in response to President Zuma’s unwillingness to speak on the 
Nkandla scandal (South African History Online, 2015). The State of the Nation 
Address of President Zuma on 12 February 2015 will be remembered as one of the 
most controversial breaches of parliamentary rules in South African history. Before 
the State of the Nation Address, the EFF members of parliament warned that they 
will raise the issue of Nkandla and would request that the president indicates when 
he would ‘pay back the money’. EFF members were eventually removed from 
parliament during the address on the instruction issued by the speaker who 
considered their continuous chanting of the slogan ‘pay back the money’ as 
disruptive (Mail & Guardian, 2015). Following the allegation that the ‘security 
officials’ who forcefully removed EFF members were in fact undercover policemen 
who broke parliamentary rules,  the DA’s members walked out in protest (South 
African History Online, 2015). COPE members of parliament had earlier walked 
away from the sitting in protest that they will not listen to a president who had 
confessed to breaching the constitution which he swore to protect. 
3.5 The Constitutional Court Decision – The Final Hit 
The opposition parties in Parliament were frustrated at the ruling party’s (ANC) 
choice of settling the matter within cabinet and Parliament where it has executive 
and majority advantage respectively over all the other political parties joined 
together. The most aggressive among the opposition parties, the EFF, went to the 
Constitutional Court to challenge the Speaker of the National Assembly, President 
of the Republic of South Africa and others for their roles in negating the 
implementation of the Public Protector’s report on the security upgrade of Zuma’s 
homestead (see Notice of Motion, 2015). The Public Protector and DA later joined 
hands with the EFF. The hearing date of the case was 09 February 2016, while the 
date of judgment delivery was 31 March 2016, (News 24, 2016). The most important 
aspect of the Constitutional Court judgment was on whether the Public Protector has 
powers to ‘take appropriate remedial action’ or whether her findings constituted 
merely a recommendation that could be set aside by the President, cabinet members 
or Parliament using executive power or parliamentary majority. For example, 
whether her remedial action requiring President Zuma to pay back a reasonable 
portion of the money spent installing non-security upgrades at his private homestead 
at Nkandla in his personal capacity was binding on the President. 
The view of opposition parties in Parliament had been in agreement with the Public 
Protector’s report and supported the remedial action ordering the president, with the 
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assistance of the South African Police Service and National Treasury, to determine 
the reasonable costs of those features and repay a reasonable portion thereof to the 
State (Public Protector’s report, 2014). 
The Speaker of the National Assembly, Minister of Police and President had argued 
that the Public Protector’s power to take remedial action merely amounted to 
recommendations and therefore was not binding on the President - or anyone - until 
another appropriate authority has acted on the report (Zuma, 2014). As a matter of 
fact before the hearing, the President had argued that the steps he took were in 
compliance with the Public Protector’s remedial action. The steps taken by the 
president included referring the investigation and report of the Public Protector to 
the Minister of Police, SIU and National Assembly via ad hoc committees who all 
shared the same view. The opposition parties and Public Protector have maintained 
that the investigation, report and all other processes followed by President Zuma in 
the matter were unlawful, for example, Congress of People’s (COPE) withdrawal 
from the activities of the ad hoc committee on the grounds of its illegality is another 
clear point against ANC’s attempt to use its majority in Parliament to protect the 
chief executive and cabinet members for their wrong doing on the security upgrade 
of President Zuma’s homestead. At the meeting of 25 September 2014, the members 
representing the Congress of the People (COPE), although not members of the 
committee, highlighted the party’s objections to the constitutionality of the 
committee. All other parties disagreed with the interpretation of COPE members of 
Parliament and agreed that the committee was indeed constitutional. The 
representatives of COPE then left the meeting stating that the party would follow the 
proceedings of the committee, but would not participate in its work (see Parliament, 
2014). 
The Public Protector’s submission is that her power to take appropriate remedial 
action is final and binding and implementable except if overruled by the judiciary, 
of which President Zuma and the Speaker of House of Assembly vehemently 
opposed (see Madonsela, 2014). However during the hearing, President Zuma agreed 
that the Public Protector’s report was binding. He thereafter offered that he would 
refund a reasonable portion of the upgrade’s expenditure at his homestead (Pretorius, 
2016). The Speaker of the National Assembly and the ANC still hold the view that 
setting up ad hoc committees and considering several reports, side by side with the 
Public Protectors report remains her lawful responsibility to put the actions of the 
executive to check (Gqirana, 2016). To date, the speaker refuses to apologize to 
South Africans, even though the Constitutional Court ruled that her approach and 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                         Vol. 8, no. 2/2016 
 
50 
failure to accept remedial action of the Public Protector was inconsistent with the 
constitutional provisions. Our view is that the Speaker’s choice was to adhere to the 
majority rule that her party has and to use it best in Parliament, that way complying 
with her job and the President could not be impeached under her leadership. The 
game of numbers has always been in her favour since she took office as Speaker of 
Parliament. Apparently, in a unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court 
presided over by Chief Justice, the court held that the Public Protector had the 
constitutional power to take appropriate remedial action which has a binding legal 
effect (News24, 2016). The decision of the President or the National Assembly 
speaker to respond to the binding remedial action taken by the Public Protector was 
unconstitutional since the remedial action can only be set aside through a proper 
judicial process. The court’s decision was in line with the position of the Public 
Protector’s report and stand throughout the saga. 
The court thus held that the National Assembly’s resolution, based on the Minister’s 
findings exonerating the President from liability, was unlawful and not consistent 
with the constitution. The court also held that, by failing to comply with the Public 
Protector’s order, the President failed to ‘uphold, defend and respect’ the constitution 
because a duty to repay the money was specifically imposed on him through the 
Public Protector’s constitutional power. The court further declared the conduct of 
the President and the National Assembly inconsistent with their constitutional 
obligations. Accordingly, the EFF and DA’s claims fell within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the court. The court ordered the National Treasury to determine the 
reasonable portion that the President must pay for the five non-security items listed 
above and report back to the court within 60 days. The court ordered the President 
to make payment within 45 days thereafter. The President was also ordered to 
reprimand the Ministers involved in the expenditure at Nkandla. Finally, the court 
declared that the remedial action taken by the Public Protector is binding. The 
President, Minister, and Speaker were ordered to pay the applicants’ costs, including 
those of two counsels (News24, 2016). 
President Zuma apologized to South Africa for using public money to fund his 
private residence renovation, but for many his apology fell on deaf ears. The court’s 
ruling and President Zuma’s apology led to many prominent South Africans and 
groups, including the opposition parties, to call for the resignation of the President 
for failing to uphold the constitution he swore to protect (Legalbrief, 2016). 
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Our view is that the core principles of democracy as Theletsane, (2014); Fringpong, 
(1999) outlined should be allowed to form the basis of any democracy if it is to thrive 
in a society. The principles of the rule of law and constitutionalism settled the case 
of security upgrade at Nkandla after several attempts by the ruling party (ANC) to 
use its majority to block the remedial action of the Public Protector on the matter. 
The will of the people/majority must be respected in a democracy and citizen 
participation should be encouraged. All that played out in the Nkandlagate was 
largely fuelled by people’s desire to satisfy their curiosity through their participation 
in the things that their elected representatives do or are meant to do. Citizen’s 
participation should be exercised periodically in free and fair elections through 
which elected representatives should assume leadership positions in society. 
In the first place, ANC has to obey the Constitutional Court ruling largely because it 
knows that it cannot afford to explain another major breaking of the law to the voters 
during election if it fails to obey the court order. The government should be 
established in power only for the purpose of serving its citizens; this core tenet of 
democracy is important and should guide elected leaders’ actions while discharging 
their responsibilities. The government should be subject to the power of the people 
who should be able to remove the government in terms of constitutional provision, 
for example through referendum or periodic elections, thus the citizens should 
exercise its voting power to choose those who will lead them. Separation of powers 
based on checks and balances especially among the three arms of government; the 
executive, legislature and judiciary, should be contained in the constitution and 
respected for example, in the case of Nkandlagate where the Speaker capitalized on 
majority and failed to check the executive actions, the judiciary was called upon by 
the minority to save the South African nascent democracy. Respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedom, as contained in the constitution, definitely enhances the 
democracy of any society. For instance, the right to information made it possible for 
people to enquire on the Nkandlagate while the right to life guaranteed protection 
from the state to all those who fought for the truth on Nkandlagate. 
 
4. Conclusion 
There is absolutely no doubt that South Africa is a formidable example of democracy 
in its continent, despite its challenges in the application of majority rule, attempts at 
social cohesion, neo-liberalisation of its political economy, global politics and 
immigration (Umezurike, 2015). South African democracy is passing through some 
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difficulties including especially poverty, unemployment, inequality, high level of 
HIV/AIDS, corruption, plummeting educational standards, electricity shedding, loss 
of rand value in the global market and rampant strikes especially in the mining 
industry.1  
A cause for concern is this latest Nkandlagate that besmirched the country over the 
past few years. The investigation culminating in a report by the Public Protector was 
highly contested in the public arena and at executive, parliamentary and judiciary 
levels. The constitutional powers of the Public Protector were challenged by both the 
President and Speaker of the National Assembly, while the Public Protector and the 
opposition parties held the view that the findings and remedial action of the Public 
Protector could not be set aside or reviewed by any other body except the judiciary; 
the President and Speaker of National Assembly’s view was that they were merely 
recommendations that could be rejected using other bodies. The Constitutional Court 
decision supported the view of the Public Protector and confirmed that the President 
and Speaker’s second guessing of the remedial action was a breach of the 
constitution.  
The practice of majority rule in a democracy does not guarantee best practice in a 
society, especially if other principles of democracy are neglected. Other principles 
of democracy that must be adhered to include the following: rule of law, 
constitutionalism, citizen’s participation in management of their affairs, periodic free 
and fair elections; government existence to serve the citizens and the citizens in turn 
making decisions as to who should serve them, separation of powers, checks and 
balances among the three arms of government and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedom as outlined in the constitution. 
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